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The nature of the problem
In recent decades, concern has been mounting over whether 
democratic governments have the necessary incentives 
and capabilities to protect the long-term interests of their 
citizens1, particularly their future citizens. Both the academic 
literature on governance and everyday political discourse are 
replete with talk of ‘short-termism’, ‘political myopia’, ‘policy 
short-sightedness’, a ‘presentist bias’ and weak ‘anticipatory 
governance2. Such concerns have been intensified by the 
growing capacity of humanity to cause ‘severe, pervasive 
and irreversible’ damage to 
critical biophysical systems 
at a planetary level, for 
example via anthropogenic 
climate change3. But flawed 
environmental stewardship is 
not the only problem. There 
is also much anxiety in many 
democracies about poor 
long-term fiscal management, 
inadequate investment 
in public infrastructure, 
insufficient planning for the 
consequences of an ageing 
population, and deficiencies 
with respect to early 
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intervention programmes and emergency 
preparedness, as well as unsatisfactory 
management of ethnic, religious and 
socio-economic cleavages. In short, there 
are many serious threats to fiscal, social 
and environmental sustainability. 
There are multiple reasons why long-
term interests are often poorly protected. 
In the case of global public goods, such as 
the atmosphere and the oceans, effective 
long-term protection requires coordinated 
international action. But multilateral 
cooperation is frequently thwarted by 
weak international institutions, the 
doctrine of territorial sovereignty, national 
self-interest, and deep ideological and 
geopolitical divisions (Ward, 2011). In 
short, spatial and inter-sectoral conflicts 
have slowed the adoption of effective 
policy responses. 
But efforts to tackle policy problems 
with long time horizons, whether global 
or local in scale, face other challenges. The 
most formidable of these are distributional 
conflicts of an inter-temporal nature: that 
is, conflicts regarding the proper allocation 
of benefits and burdens over extended 
periods of time. Such conflicts typically 
involve two distinct, yet overlapping, 
trade-offs: a clash between the interests 
of current and future citizens, and a clash 
between the interests of citizens’ current 
selves and their future selves. If policy 
makers prioritise short-term interests 
over long-term interests, there is an 
obvious risk that those living in the future 
will be worse off in some way. How, then, 
might long-term interests, and especially 
the interests of future generations, be 
properly protected?
Asymmetries in the democratic process
National democratic institutions, despite 
their many virtues, often struggle to 
cope with policy problems involving 
significant inter-temporal trade-offs. This 
is particularly the case when timeframes 
are decadal or more in nature and where 
the negative impacts of proposed policies 
(or a failure to act) appear distant and 
therefore inconsequential. Long-term 
policy issues are at a constant risk of being 
neglected in the face of current and near-
term concerns, which seem more pressing 
and immediate. The lack of effective long-
term governance is due, or so it is argued, 
to certain systemic flaws, pathologies 
and asymmetries within the democratic 
process.4 Among these are the following: 
•	 a	tendency	for	voters	to	have	
positive time preferences (i.e. they 
are moderately impatient and prefer 
something today rather than in the 
distant future); 
•	 relatively	short	electoral	cycles	in	
which vote-maximising politicians 
have strong incentives to discount the 
future; 
•	 the	often	disproportionate	power	
exercised by vested interests with 
predominantly short-term priorities; 
•	 the	difficulty	of	ensuring	that	
decision-makers do not renege on 
future-related promises (variously 
referred to as the ‘compliance’ or 
‘time inconsistency’ problem); 
•	 deep	ideological	divisions	over	the	
best solutions even when the nature 
of the policy problem is widely 
recognised; and 
•	 the	fact	that	future	generations	have	
no voice, vote or bargaining power, 
yet will be profoundly affected 
by the policy choices of current 
governments (see Boston and Lempp, 
2011). 
Hence, whatever advantages future 
persons may come to possess in the 
future, today they face the disadvantage 
of being abstract, remote, disembodied 
and dependent. They are utterly reliant 
on current generations to represent 
and protect their interests; yet there 
is no corresponding dependence of 
current voters on people living in the 
future (Timlin, 2012). Normal political 
accountabilities and reciprocities thus 
do not apply. As Warren Buffet (1977) 
once stated: ‘when human politicians 
choose between the next election and the 
next generation, it’s clear what usually 
happens’. Or to quote Al Gore, ‘the future 
whispers while the present shouts’ (Gore, 
1992, p.170).
Such asymmetries in the democratic 
process would not matter if humanity 
lacked the capacity to inflict harm – and 
especially irreversible harm – on people 
living in the future. Nor would the 
challenge be as great if the policies required 
to secure long-term benefits (whether 
economic, social or environmental in 
form) involved no imposition of costs or 
losses (e.g. extra fiscal expenditure and 
related increased tax burdens) on people 
living today. Yet, because short-term 
sacrifices are often required, protecting 
the interests of future generations is 
politically challenging. To compound 
matters, the costs of ‘policy investments’– 
for instance, pre-funding future pension 
costs, reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
or helping to lower rates of obesity – are 
typically certain, real and visible, whereas 
the promised benefits are frequently 
uncertain, intangible or invisible (Boston 
and Lempp, 2011; Jacobs, 2011). If voters 
are uncertain about the benefits – perhaps 
because they distrust governments 
or doubt their capacity to deliver, or 
because the relevant causal chains are 
highly complex and opaque – they will 
be understandably reluctant to support 
such investments (Jacobs and Matthews, 
2012). Yet if governments do not invest 
adequately for the longer term, future 
citizens will be worse off.
There is a further complication. 
Inter-temporal conflicts take different 
forms. Sometimes they involve a non-
simultaneous exchange between ‘goods’ 
that are part of a similar system of value 
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(e.g. upfront financial costs in return for 
future financial benefits). Other times the 
exchange is between ‘goods’ constituting 
different systems of value (e.g. near-
term financial costs in return for the 
better long-term protection of important 
environmental ‘goods’). The latter types 
of non-simultaneous exchange are 
particularly difficult because the ‘goods’ 
in question are non-commensurable 
and the hoped-for benefits may have few 
advocates in the policy process.
How should the problem of 
protecting long-term interests be 
addressed? Are there any feasible and 
effective ‘solutions’? And are there 
ways of countering the inter-temporal 
asymmetries evident in contemporary 
democracies without generating new and 
unintended problems? This article briefly 
outlines four possible approaches, giving 
particular attention to proposals to 
protect the interests of future generations 
by constraining the decisions of policy 
makers, both now and in the future, 
through constitutional means. While 
such reforms have been championed by 
various international bodies, interest 
groups and scholars, we acknowledge 
that they are not without limitations 
and drawbacks. Accordingly, we also 
outline a number of other constraining 
mechanisms (or ‘commitment devices’, 
as they are sometimes called) which 
may serve a similar purpose. While we 
consider the options for constitutional 
reform across a range of democratic 
jurisdictions, we pay particular attention 
to the specific constitutional context of 
New Zealand, which, unlike almost all 
other democracies, lacks an entrenched 
constitution with the status of supreme 
law. But first let us clarify what is meant 
by ‘future generations’ and the nature of 
their ‘interests’, ‘needs’ and ‘rights’.
Who are ‘future generations’? 
If the term ‘present generations’ is limited 
to those alive today (including their ‘future 
selves’), then the term ‘future generations’ 
must logically refer to all those born 
after today, regardless of where or when. 
On this basis, significant overlaps are 
inevitable: future generations will co-
exist with current generations, often over 
long stretches of time and in a constantly 
evolving manner. For the purposes of this 
discussion, we are concerned with the 
well-being of all those who will be alive at 
some future point in time, including the 
distant future. This includes the ‘future 
selves’ of people alive today, some of 
whom are likely to live well into the 22nd 
century. Their long-term interests ought 
to be protected, not only the interests of 
those who are as yet unborn. 
But such a stance immediately begs 
many more questions. For instance, 
what exactly are the ‘interests’ of future 
generations? Are they the same as the 
interests of present generations, or 
might they be different? Further, should 
the focus be on the ‘interests’ of future 
generations, or on their ‘needs’ or ‘rights’ 
(Ward, 2011)? Additionally, how should 
the ‘interests’ (‘needs’ or ‘rights’) of future 
generations be balanced against the 
‘interests’ (‘needs’ or ‘rights’) of present 
generations? Aside from this, there are 
important questions about whether, and 
to what extent, policy makers should 
discount the future (Caney, 2008, 2009) 
and over the implications of following 
a ‘precautionary’ approach to the 
management of future risks. Such issues 
are complex and daunting. There are 
many different philosophical approaches 
and a plethora of competing principles. 
It is not possible to address such matters 
here in any detail, but several brief 
comments are in order.
First, there are good ethical reasons 
for placing a high, and equal, moral 
value on all human beings irrespective of 
when or where they are born. As Rawls 
has argued, ‘from a moral point of view, 
there are no grounds for discounting 
future well-being on the basis of pure 
time preference’ (Rawls, 1972, p.287). 
Hence, people living in the future should 
be valued equally to those alive today. 
An alternative view, under which, for 
example, people in the future are deemed 
to be of less value, is difficult to defend 
morally or logically.
Secondly, it is unlikely that the 
‘interests’ or ‘needs’ of people living in 
the future will change dramatically, at 
least over the next century or so, from 
those of people living today. Of course, 
the further we venture into the future, the 
more difficult it becomes to know what 
humanity will need. Even planet Earth, 
for instance, may cease to be essential for 
human life. Yet, even then, it is reasonable 
to assume that citizens in the far future 
will continue to value Earth as their 
original home planet and for its many 
life-supporting qualities (Mank, 2009). 
Thirdly, assuming that the interests of 
future generations are broadly congruent 
with those of humanity today, what might 
such interests include? With little doubt, 
one such interest will be preserving a 
physical environment that is fit for human 
health, flourishing and well-being (Ekeli, 
2007). This in turn implies that pollution 
levels must be within ‘safe’ thresholds, that 
high levels of biodiversity are maintained, 
and that there is sufficient fertile soil to 
enable the production of an adequate 
quantity of food (Rockström et al., 2009). 
Aside from a healthy environment, future 
generations will almost certainly also have 
an interest in sound and sustainable public 
finances, proper planning for disasters, 
the mitigation of serious risks, the 
maintenance of democratic institutions 
and basic liberties, the provision of public 
goods and services, and the preservation 
of their cultural heritage.
Fourthly, the words ‘interests’, 
‘needs’ and ‘rights’ have different (albeit 
overlapping) meanings. As implied above, 
the term ‘interests’ has a relatively broad 
meaning, covering both general and 
specific matters, some of which are vital 
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for the maintenance of human life, while 
others are more relevant to the enjoyment 
of life. The term ‘needs’ refers to things 
that are more ethically demanding, or of 
a higher moral order, than ‘interests’. If 
something is a ‘need’, then it is essential 
for the particular purpose in question. 
If the need is not satisfied, there will be 
significant loss or harm. ‘Rights’ refer to 
morally justifiable claims, often based on 
specific human ‘needs’. If accorded legal 
status, such rights will be both morally 
and legally binding. Having said this, 
few rights can be regarded as absolute or 
unconditional (Feinberg, 1973) and the 
use of ‘rights’ in a legal context is highly 
contested. Moreover, since rights are often 
in conflict, they must be balanced against 
each other – and against other morally 
relevant considerations. 
Fifthly, it is sometimes objected that 
ascribing rights to future generations is 
neither legitimate nor practical because 
‘rights’ can only be assigned when there 
are clearly identifiable interests to protect. 
Non-existing individuals, it is argued, 
cannot be granted moral or legal rights 
because there is no defined right-holder 
and no consensus on the specific rights 
they ought to possess. Sceptics argue 
that a specific legal obligation to protect 
future generations cannot and should not 
be placed on present generations or their 
governments. Against these objections, 
defenders of the notion that future 
generations should be accorded rights 
argue that such rights are not individual 
rights but rather ‘generational rights’, 
‘group-specific rights’ or ‘community 
rights’ (United Nations General Assembly, 
2013). Hence, they are decoupled from 
the strict requirement for an identifiable 
right-holder. From this standpoint, the 
values or interests being ‘protected do 
not depend upon knowing the kinds of 
individuals that may exist or the numbers 
in any given future generation’ (Brown 
Weiss, 1992, p.24). Although relatively 
few international or domestic legal 
instruments currently refer to, or clearly 
protect, the rights of future generations 
(Brown Weiss, 1989; Ward, 2011), there 
are plausible ways of incorporating the 
language of ‘rights’ in such instruments 
and doing so in a manner which is 
meaningful, fair and effective.
In what ways might future generations’ 
interests be protected?
To the extent that the interests (needs 
or rights) of future generations are not 
adequately protected by contemporary 
democratic institutions, there are at least 
four broad options available, each of 
which rests on a distinctive intervention 
logic (or set of logics). Such options are 
not mutually exclusive. All four could 
be applied simultaneously, although not 
necessarily in the same policy domain. 
The four options are: 
1. insulating decision-making from 
short-term democratic pressures;
2. incentivising elected decision-makers 
to give greater priority to long-term 
considerations;
3. enhancing the capacity of elected 
decision-makers to think about and 
plan for the long term; and 
4. constraining the policy choices 
available to elected decision-makers, 
especially in relation to issues with 
significant long-term impacts.
The first option is to shift decision-
rights on important policy issues 
away from democratically-elected 
officials to independent bodies and/or 
global institutions. The aim here is to 
insulate decisions from the short-term 
pressures and biases of the democratic 
process. Such an approach is already 
widely employed across the democratic 
world with respect to many regulatory 
matters and the oversight of monetary 
policy. But such a strategy poses serious 
questions. What decision-rights should 
be transferred to non-elected bodies? 
What assurance is there that the decisions 
of such bodies will better protect the 
interests of future generations? And how 
are important values, such as democratic 
control, accountability and legitimacy, 
to be preserved if an increasing number 
of vital decision-rights are no longer the 
responsibility of elected representatives?
A second option is to increase the 
incentives for democratically-elected 
officials to consider the interests of future 
generations (Boston and Lempp, 2011). 
One possibility under this approach 
would be to enhance the ‘voice’ of the 
future by establishing new institutions 
(or strengthening existing institutions) 
which have future-oriented missions and 
responsibilities. Examples might include 
a Parliamentary Committee for the 
Future (as in Finland), a Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Future Generations (as 
in Hungary), a Sustainable Development 
Commission (as previously in Britain) or a 
Commission for the Future (as previously 
in New Zealand). More radical proposals 
could include establishing, perhaps via a 
random ballot, an additional legislative 
chamber with specific responsibilities to 
promote measures designed to protect 
the interests of future generations. 
But many of these ideas have already 
been implemented somewhere in the 
democratic world and their effectiveness, 
thus far, has been limited. Moreover, 
many future-oriented institutions have 
not survived.
A third option is to enhance the 
capacity of governments to think long-
term, to undertake various kinds of 
foresight activities and to engage in 
‘anticipatory governance’ (Fuerth, 2012). 
By building such capacity, it is argued, 
governments would have a deeper 
knowledge of long-term risks, threats and 
vulnerabilities and thus would be better 
equipped to plan for the future. Under 
this approach, governments should 
strengthen their investment in strategic 
foresight, establish long-term think tanks, 
The challenge ... is how to ensure that 
policy makers pursue a consistent long-
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and improve their capability in areas like 
strategic planning, urban planning and 
infrastructure management. Yet many 
governments have already implemented 
such strategies, and, again, their 
effectiveness is by no means clear.
The fourth and final option is to 
constrain the decisions of democratically-
elected officials in various ways. As noted 
earlier, among the problems afflicting 
democratic processes in relation to 
inter-temporal trade-offs are those of 
‘compliance’ and ‘time inconsistency’. 
The challenge, in brief, is how to ensure 
that policy makers pursue a consistent 
long-term strategy over time and are not 
deflected from a prudent policy path, once 
adopted, by short-term electoral pressures 
or other temptations. The literatures 
in the fields of social psychology and 
behavioural economics suggest that one 
solution may lie in using ‘commitment 
devices’, as these can be powerful drivers 
of human behaviour (Bryan et al., 2010; 
Hagemann, 2011; Sunstein, 1988, 2014). 
The aim of such devices is to bind 
decision-makers to particular courses 
of action, thereby helping to mitigate 
any problems arising from inconsistent 
or fluctuating motives, a weak will or 
countervailing external pressures. 
Commitment devices are relevant 
to all spheres of life, but are particularly 
applicable where the policy pay-offs 
may contribute to decisions dominated 
by short-term expediency. They work 
by limiting actors’ future discretion or 
by reinforcing their desire to exercise 
self-restraint – whether by increasing 
the rewards for good behaviour or by 
penalising bad behaviour (or both). 
Commitment devices are common in 
politics, although the term is rarely used. 
At one end of the spectrum, they include 
constitutional provisions that are designed 
to limit the actions of future decision-
makers and are deliberately difficult to 
change or circumvent (see Holmes, 1988; 
Sunstein, 1988). For instance, such devices 
are frequently used to safeguard the 
interests and rights of minority groups in 
the face of intolerant majorities by giving 
power to the judiciary to strike down laws 
that breach basic rights. At the other end 
of the spectrum are such things as election 
promises and verbal commitments. 
The latter are reinforced by the risk of 
embarrassment, shame and the loss of 
credibility if they are not upheld. 
Between these two extremes are a 
wide range of mechanisms: incorporating 
particular protections, procedures or 
requirements into legislation; establishing 
institutions with long-term missions; 
negotiating bipartisan or multi-party 
agreements on important long-term 
policy issues; and designing policies and 
programmes in ways that make them 
more difficult politically to alter – for 
instance, establishing endowments and 
trust funds, creating social insurance 
arrangements based on individualised, 
earnings-related benefits, and so forth. 
Of relevance to this article, it is common 
in New Zealand (and many other 
jurisdictions) for the interests and needs 
of future generations to be given limited 
recognition in ordinary statutes: e.g. the 
Local Government Act 2002 (sections 10 
and 14) and the Resource Management 
Act 1991 (section 5).
If the aim of the commitment device 
is to help encourage a consistent pattern 
of behaviour over time, then the device 
needs to be workable and credible and 
impose a genuine constraint (e.g. by 
being costly to change). Yet if the device 
is to be durable, there must also be the 
flexibility for policy makers to respond 
to unexpected contingencies. Designing 
devices that strike a sensible balance 
between these contrary imperatives 
requires skill and dexterity. In the end, 
governments can only constrain their 
successors to a modest degree. Whereas 
Odysseus in Homer’s epic poem could 
rely on others to limit his future agency, 
governments always retain the power to 
unbind themselves – even if it may be 
difficult and politically costly.
While each of the four options is 
worthy of consideration, our focus here is 
on constraining solutions, and in particular 
constraining democratically-elected 
decision-makers by giving constitutional 
protection to future generations. In what 
follows, we consider how the interests 
of future generations have been given 
expression in democratic constitutions, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the various 
approaches available, and the possibility of 
granting constitutional protection to future 
generations in New Zealand.
How can constitutions protect future 
generations?
A constitution is the fundamental 
building block of a nation’s legal system. 
It defines the powers and responsibilities 
of the various executive, legislative and 
judicial institutions, the relationship 
between citizens, and, most importantly, 
the relationship between citizens and the 
state (Hiskes, 2009). Constitutions are 
not, however, consistent across borders, 
cultures or legal systems. They differ 
greatly in terms of their supremacy, 
entrenchment and form. On the one 
hand, many constitutions are written, 
entrenched and supreme. This means that 
they are formally incorporated in law, can 
be amended only with a supermajority 
and take precedence over ordinary 
legislation (Ekeli, 2007). On the other 
hand, some constitutions, such as New 
Zealand’s, are found not in one document 
but in many documents, conventions and 
judicial decisions, none of which enjoy 
the status of supreme law (Palmer, 2006). 
Yet, regardless of the particular features of 
constitutions, they all perform the same 
dual roles of regulating relationships and 
Whereas Odysseus in Homer’s epic poem 
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limiting government power (Keith, 2008). 
Such roles make constitutions an ideal 
space in which to promote the interests 
of future generations (Gosseries, 2008; 
Hayward, 2005). By their nature, they 
guarantee rights for citizens today and 
into the future (Hiskes, 2009). Developing 
explicit constitutional recognition for 
future generations, therefore, has the 
potential to ensure that rights today are 
not unduly valued over rights tomorrow. 
With the inclusion of appropriate 
wording, a constitution can give future 
generations greater moral and legal 
status and increase the extent to which 
executive, legislative and judicial bodies 
consider the long-term consequences 
of their actions (Wright, 1990). In a 
democracy with a written constitution, 
such a provision would bind successive 
generations of legislators to account for 
future interests; in a democracy like New 
Zealand with an unwritten constitution 
it would give added legal recognition 
to future generations and, depending 
on the specific wording, could elevate 
their interests to the level of enforceable 
fundamental rights.
Do constitutions protect future generations 
at present?
There are references to ‘future generations’ 
in numerous domestic and international 
legal instruments. For instance, at the 
international level, a recent survey by 
Ward (2011) identified no fewer than 
45 references to ‘future generations’ in a 
wide range of binding and non-binding 
instruments. While this is positive, the 
majority of these instruments deal solely 
with environmental matters, such as the 
protection of wild fauna and flora, the 
climate system, the marine environment 
and biological diversity.5 Such agreements 
include the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (1992), 
the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity (1992) and the 
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent 
Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management (2001). 
Although ‘future generations’ also feature 
in a number of international agreements 
and declarations dealing with diverse 
subjects like peace and security, education, 
cultural heritage and scientific matters, 
the level of recognition is limited.6 
The large number of references in 
international law indicates that global 
governance is fundamentally guided by a 
concern for the long-term well-being of 
humanity. That said, in most cases such 
references are contained in preambles or 
in statements of objectives rather than 
the operative text of such instruments. 
They are thus purely aspirational and do 
not place legally enforceable obligations 
on states. In some cases there are specific 
duties requiring states to protect future 
generations. The UNESCO Convention for 
the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage (1972) requires all states 
to ensure the ‘protection, conservation, 
presentation and transmission to future 
generations of identified cultural and 
natural heritage … situated on their 
territory’ (article 4), and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (2007) grants indigenous peoples 
the ‘right to transmit to future generations 
their histories, languages, oral traditions, 
philosophies, writing systems and 
literatures’ (article 13). On the whole, 
however, the international community has 
not sought to extend, at least in a significant 
way, any of the human rights universally 
accorded to current generations to future 
generations (Ward, 2011).
Turning to the national level, over 20 
countries (and several states and provinces) 
have incorporated protections for future 
generations in their constitutions (see 
IHRC and SEHN, 2008; McLeod, 2013; 
United Nations General Assembly, 2013; 
World Future Council, 2010). As in the 
international arena, often such provisions 
are contained in the preamble and are 
essentially aspirational – as, for instance, 
in Armenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Switzerland and Ukraine. But in other 
cases, including Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
France, Germany, Poland, South Africa 
and Sweden, national constitutions 
contain substantive provisions regarding 
future generations. The constitution of 
Bolivia, for example, provides that among 
the purposes and functions of the state are 
the ‘responsible use of natural resources, 
the promotion of industrialisation, and 
the conservation of the environment 
for the welfare of current and future 
generations’. Similarly, the constitution 
of Ecuador requires the state to ‘exercise 
sovereignty over biodiversity, whose 
administration and management shall be 
conducted on the basis of responsibility 
between generations’. Both provisions 
are worded to encourage positive action 
on behalf of the state; but there is no 
guarantee of rights. 
By contrast, the South African 
constitution states that everyone has the 
‘right to have the environment protected, 
for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative 
and other measures’. Similarly, the Andorran 
constitution guarantees ‘an environment 
fit for life for the coming generations’. 
These constitutions recognise the interests 
of future generations more fundamentally, 
in a way that is enforceable in the courts. 
Yet, probably to avoid undue uncertainty 
or constraints on future parliaments, they 
tie this right closely to environmental 
protection. It is uncommon for a 
constitution to protect future generations 
of their own accord, independent of 
environmental considerations. While a 
small number of nations do have such 
protection, the relevant provisions are 
worded as statements of policy rather 
than as fundamental rights. In Estonia, 
... the international community has not 
sought to extend, at least in a significant 
way, any of the human rights universally 
accorded to current generations to future 
generations ...
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for instance, the constitution’s preamble 
declares that ‘[the state] shall serve 
to protect international and external 
peace and provide security for the social 
progress and general benefit of present 
and future generations’. This provides a 
positive direction for agenda setting, but it 
has little practical or judicial value; there 
is no ambit for enforcement if it is not 
complied with.
How effective are these constitutional 
protections?
Currently, almost all of the provisions in 
national constitutions concerning future 
generations are rather vague, and, as a 
result, provide little guidance for judges 
in cases brought before the courts (Ekeli, 
2007). In Norway, the Supreme Court 
has not once referred to the provision 
in the constitution protecting future 
generations, despite its introduction more 
than 20 years ago. 
There have been a handful of cases 
in which constitutional protections 
for future generations have been 
successfully invoked in a court of law, 
but they are few and far between. In the 
case of Minors Oposa v Secretary of the 
Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (1994), the Supreme Court 
of the Philippines held that a group of 
schoolchildren had standing to challenge 
timber leasing of old-growth forests ‘for 
themselves, for others of their generation 
and for the succeeding generations’ 
(Mank, 2009). In the Chevron–Texaco 
(Pollution) Case (2010), an international 
coalition of environmental activists 
invoked Ecuador’s constitutional rights of 
nature in a case against Chevron regarding 
oil contamination in the Ecuadorian 
rainforest (Cress, 2012). Relying in part on 
the Ecuadorian constitution, the Supreme 
Court of Justice of Nueva Loja found in 
favour of the coalition and held Chevron 
liable for $8.6 billion in damages. 
At the state level in the United 
States there has also been some judicial 
recognition of the rights of future 
generations. In Montana and Hawaii, 
where environmental protections 
for future generations have been 
constitutionally safeguarded (albeit 
broadly) since the 1970s, the Supreme 
Court of each state has upheld the rights 
of future generations (Raffensperger, 
2003). In Montana, the Supreme Court 
held that Montanans have the right 
to prevent irreversible harm before it 
occurs, while in Hawaii a precautionary 
principle has been adopted in protecting 
resources for future generations. While 
such outcomes are to be welcomed, they 
are the exception rather than the norm. 
How can constitutional protections for future 
generations be drafted effectively?
When considering how constitutional 
provisions might be utilised to protect future 
generations, there is a fundamental tension 
at work. On the one hand, incorporating 
substantive guarantees has the potential to 
protect later generations from the actions 
of the generations preceding them. Yet, on 
the other hand, the more that constitutional 
protection is relied on for such purposes, 
the more the generational sovereignty 
of future legislatures is undermined 
(Sunstein, 1988; Thompson, 2005). In 
other words, constitutions (through 
a variety of amendment restrictions) 
reduce the freedom of each generation of 
decision-makers to adopt their own rules. 
They subject future generations to the laws 
of the past, creating constitutional rigidity 
and resistance to change (Gosseries, 
2008). Thomas Jefferson, for one, was an 
outspoken critic of such constitutional 
rigidity. In his view: 
a generation may bind itself as long 
as its majority continues in life; 
when that has disappeared, another 
majority is in place, holds all the 
rights and powers their predecessors 
once held, and may change their laws 
and institutions to suit themselves.7 
While this perspective fails to account 
adequately for intergenerational issues, 
including the need to protect a world with 
‘planetary boundaries’ and finite resources 
from severe and irreversible damage 
(Rockström et al., 2009), it highlights the 
fact that constitutional protections can be 
a double-edged sword (Gosseries, 2008). 
In Westminster systems of democracy, 
constitutional rigidity is limited by the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. This 
doctrine holds that current parliaments can 
only bind future parliaments on matters of 
‘manner and form’; they cannot limit their 
autonomy substantively (Eleftheriadis, 
2009). In other systems, however, 
procedures for amending constitutional 
provisions must not be so restrictive that 
they make it almost impossible for future 
generations to adopt new or revised 
provisions as needs and circumstances 
change. That said, if any constitutionally 
guaranteed rights are to be effective, they 
must have some level of supremacy and 
should not be easily trodden on by future 
parliaments.
To date, policy makers in most 
democracies have been cautious 
about future generations’ rights, 
favouring legislative sovereignty over 
intergenerational protection. They have 
focused on providing broad statements 
of policy rather than endowing future 
generations with specific rights. 
Admittedly, incorporating general 
statements of policy in a constitution can 
provide a useful reference point and serve 
as an interpretive aid, but such approaches 
do not facilitate legal enforcement or 
bind later parliaments (Timlin, 2012). 
While constitutional policy-making 
should never be rash, it should strive to 
develop provisions that serve the purpose 
for which they are intended. Hence, such 
At the state level in the United States 
there has also been some judicial 
recognition of the rights of future 
generations.  
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provisions should be designed in ways 
that give genuine additional protection 
to future generations, rather than merely 
paying them lip service. They should 
strive to change behaviours and policy 
settings, to extend time horizons, and 
to alter the priorities of legislators and 
governmental decision-makers.
Accordingly, in our view serious 
consideration should be given to 
incorporating specific ‘rights’ for future 
generations which can be effectively 
upheld in the courts. Framing 
constitutional protection in terms of 
rights would provide an avenue for current 
citizens to hold the state to account for its 
actions, potentially giving the courts the 
power to strike down legislation which 
clearly threatens the specified rights. 
In this context, the International 
Human Rights Clinic (IHRC and SEHN, 
2008) has identified criteria to guide 
the drafting of such provisions and has 
proposed some suggested wording. The 
IHRC places considerable emphasis on 
striking an appropriate balance between a 
general, open-ended right and a specific, 
articulated and enforceable right. An 
overly broad or general right might be 
ignored and difficult to enforce, while 
rights that are too specific may be easily 
circumvented. Highly specific rights may 
indicate to would-be violators that the 
courts are unlikely to enforce violations 
unless they fall under the relevant, tight 
wording of the constitutional provision. 
They may also unintentionally serve as 
a temporal restraint, as new scientific 
discoveries and technological advances 
may not be adequately accounted for 
in any narrow list of applications. The 
IHRC further emphasises that any such 
provision must be compatible with widely 
shared notions of distributive justice and 
principles of sustainable development. 
This includes ensuring that the needs of 
the present generation are met without 
compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.
The particular wording proposed 
by the IHRC is tied to environmental 
protection, and is as follows: 
Present and future generations of 
citizens of the state have the right to 
an ecologically healthy environment. 
This right includes but is not limited 
to: the enjoyment of clean air, pure 
water, and scenic lands; freedom 
from unwanted exposure to toxic 
chemicals and other contaminants; 
and a secure climate. (IHRC and 
SEHN, 2008, p.10) 
Such a provision is specific enough 
to guide judges, yet sufficiently broad to 
avoid confinement to a narrow set of facts. 
However, it is not complete in isolation. 
The IHRC emphasises that a constitution 
must also clearly highlight that the rights 
of future generations are to be weighed 
equally with other fundamental rights 
and must specify who has standing to 
enforce the right, to what standard and 
against whom. 
This, however, is no easy task. The 
traditional doctrine of standing, which 
governs who can bring proceedings 
before a court of law, appears to rule 
out altogether the possibility of invoking 
the rights of future generation in courts. 
Before being granted standing, plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that they have suffered 
an imminent injury-in-fact which is 
caused by the defendant’s conduct and 
which is redressable through the remedy 
they seek (Mank, 2009). In other words, 
this doctrine requires plaintiffs to 
demonstrate a ‘real-world’ tangible harm 
as well as a legal cause of action, to prove 
some degree of imminence in respect 
of that harm, and to show a ‘personal 
stake in the outcome’ before their claim 
can proceed (ibid.). This high standard, 
aimed at avoiding generalised grievance 
claims, is impossible to meet in respect of 
the rights of future generations. By their 
very nature, such rights protect long-
term interests which are not imminent or 
presently tangible, and are often difficult 
to remedy or redress. 
Fortunately, however, this is not the 
end of the road. Courts in many parts of 
the world have expressed a willingness 
to depart from these more traditional 
standing principles in respect of new 
rights of action which fit awkwardly 
into the common law model (ibid.). In 
New Zealand, the standing requirement 
is largely gone for judicial review 
claims, and in the US, Congress has 
relaxed the requirements of imminence 
and redressability in respect of claims 
regarding environmental impact 
statements, claims regarding the Freedom 
of Information Act, claims brought on 
behalf of a state, and more generally 
where procedural injury is concerned. 
In Massachusetts v EPA (2007), a judicial 
review of the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s refusal to regulate tailpipe 
emissions, the US Supreme Court 
considered redressability to be a matter of 
degree rather than a minimum standard 
and relaxed the standard of imminence 
to include the long-term effects of 
climate change. This was a landmark 
decision, establishing beyond doubt that 
Congress has the power to relax the 
traditional requirements of imminence 
and redressability. It also indicated a 
broader trend of judicial willingness to 
relax standing requirements in respect 
of environmental and procedural 
claims (Mank, 2009). This more flexible 
approach can be traced back to the case 
of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), in 
which Justice Kennedy commented that:
as government programs and policies 
become more complex and far 
reaching, we must be sensitive to the 
There have been a handful of cases 
in which constitutional protections 
for future generations have been 
successfully invoked in a court of law, 
but they are few and far between.
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articulation of new rights of action 
that do not have clear analogs in 
our common law tradition . . . In 
my view, Congress has the power to 
define injuries and articulate chains 
of causation that will give rise to 
a case or controversy where none 
existed before.
While a constitutional right protecting 
future generations fits awkwardly in the 
common law tradition, it is a ‘new right of 
action’ for which allowance could be made. 
If a statutory body, such as a Parliamentary 
Commission for the Future, was granted 
specific sole authority to take legal action 
when the rights of future generations 
were at risk of being violated, it would 
eliminate any confusion regarding the 
breadth and scope of standing. However, 
such institutions are rare and sometimes 
ineffective. Thus, constitutional provisions 
also need to make allowance, clearly and 
carefully, for public plaintiffs or genuine 
interest groups to bring claims on behalf 
of their successors. 
How might future generations be protected 
in New Zealand’s constitution?
New Zealand is one of only three 
democracies in the world without a 
formal written constitution (Chen, 2011). 
There is no supreme law permitting the 
judiciary to strike down legislation, and 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
offers only limited legal recourse to citizens 
who believe they have been wronged by 
the state – most particularly because it 
cannot be used to strike down primary 
legislation (Palmer and Palmer, 2004). 
Any constitutional protection for future 
generations will apply very differently to 
countries with written constitutions. The 
benefit of New Zealand’s model, however, 
is that it is flexible and capable of adapting 
to changing circumstances. It lacks much 
of the rigidity of other constitutions, 
and there are few entrenched provisions. 
In such a constitutional landscape, 
incorporating a fundamental right 
relating to the environment, and more 
generally protecting the interests of 
future generations, would be relatively 
simple and would not unduly constrain 
subsequent parliaments. 
Currently, no such clause exists in 
New Zealand legislation, nor is one in the 
pipeline. In fact, New Zealand is among 
only 16 countries that have failed thus far 
to recognise and provide for the right to a 
healthy environment in their constitution 
(Browning, 2013). For a state which prides 
itself on constitutional flexibility, our 
constitution arrangements are, at least in 
certain respects, surprisingly outdated. 
An obvious way forward would be to 
incorporate a new provision in the existing 
Bill of Rights Act. In our view, there 
would be merit in including such a clause, 
provided it is consistent with the IHRC’s 
recommendations. In principle, this could 
protect future generations in the same way 
as the Act does other rights, such as free 
speech or freedom of religion. 
An analysis of the merits of a written 
constitution is not possible here. Never-
theless, many New Zealand academics 
and legal practitioners are strong advo-
cates for such a step.5  Moreover, a recent 
consultation conducted by the Constitu-
tional Advisory Panel (2013) has identi-
fied that intergenerational equity is one 
of the key themes in public discussions of 
New Zealand’s constitution. If a reform 
of New Zealand’s constitution were ini-
tiated, it could provide a unique oppor-
tunity to incorporate the rights of future 
generations explicitly into New Zealand’s 
first written constitution (Glazebrook, 
2011). Although such rights would need 
to be carefully and contextually worded, 
providing sufficient detail regarding en-
forceability and the state’s obligations, 
the IHRC’s guidelines should provide a 
useful starting point.
Alternatives to constitutional recognition
Incorporating the rights of future 
generations into national constitutions 
is not the only way to help protect 
and enhance the well-being of future 
generations. As noted earlier, other kinds 
of constraints – or commitment devices – 
are available. Such devices will not impose 
constitutional limitations on current 
or future legislatures, but they will help 
to constrain decisions in other ways or 
change the incentives facing policy makers: 
for example, by imposing new reporting 
obligations on government, by enhancing 
the quality of information on the likely 
long-term impacts of policy choices, 
by increasing the extent of advocacy on 
behalf of future generations, and, more 
generally, by enhancing the extent to 
which governments can be held politically 
accountable for decisions (or non-
decisions) with major long-term impacts. 
Examples of such devices include: 
•	 public	agencies	with	‘guardianship-
type’ roles in relation to future 
generations; 
•	 advisory	bodies	with	responsibilities	
to promote sustainable development; 
•	 parliamentary	committees	with	
specific duties to consider long-term 
issues; 
•	 legislative	requirements	for	
governments to produce regular 
reports on their efforts to protect 
citizens’ long-term interests (e.g. 
posterity impact statements); and 
•	 incorporating	specific	requirements	
into domestic statutes: for instance, 
recent amendments to New Zealand’s 
State Sector Act 1988 (section 
32) impose specific ‘stewardship’ 
responsibilities on departmental chief 
executives.
None of these mechanisms, whether 
individually or in combination, 
represents a fully effective solution to 
the inter-temporal asymmetries evident 
in democratic processes. But, if well-
... New Zealand is among only 16 
countries that have failed thus far  
to recognise and provide for the right  
to a healthy environment in their 
constitution ...
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designed, they have the potential to shift 
the balance in the direction of future 
interests, albeit modestly. There is space 
here for only a few brief comments on 
several of these measures.
Internationally, the best known 
examples of ‘guardianship-type’ bodies 
include the Commission for Future 
Generations in Israel (2001–06) and 
the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Future Generations in Hungary 
(2007–). The former commission was 
mandated to review legislation and 
regulations with implications for future 
generations and to provide advice to 
the Knesset on all matters pertaining 
to future generations. It has since been 
abolished. The Hungarian commissioner 
is one of four parliamentary ombudsmen 
and is charged with safeguarding the 
constitutional right of citizens to a healthy 
environment, investigating citizens’ 
complaints regarding environmental 
issues, advocating on behalf of long-
term sustainability, and undertaking 
research on sustainability issues. Despite 
the benefit of these institutions in theory, 
their effectiveness in practice has proved 
to be limited. This is partly the result 
of funding constraints; but it is also 
attributable to their limited powers and 
a lack of constitutional protection, as 
witnessed by the abolition of the Israeli 
commission after only five years.
National initiatives of a slightly 
different nature, focusing instead on 
sustainable development, are another 
possibility. Examples include the British 
Sustainable Development Commission 
(which was abolished after a decade in 
2011), the German Parliamentary Advisory 
Council on Sustainable Development, the 
Brazilian Commission on Environment 
and Sustainable Development, and the 
Welsh Commissioner for Sustainable 
Futures. The Welsh example is 
of particular interest because the 
government has a legal duty to promote 
sustainable development. Indeed, the 
government is in the process of enacting 
a Well-being of Future Generations 
(Wales) Bill, which the commissioner 
played an integral role in drafting (Welsh 
Government, 2014). The bill aims to 
embed the principle of sustainability at 
all levels of government, with the aim 
of ensuring that the present needs of 
citizens are met without compromising 
the ability of future citizens to meet 
their needs. It sets ambitious long-term 
goals, introduces national indicators for 
measuring well-being, establishes a Future 
Generations Commissioner to serve as 
an advocate for future generations, and 
requires the preparation of well-being 
plans across the local government sector. 
It will be interesting to observe how this 
legislation, once enacted and operative, 
alters decision-making processes and 
outcomes. Potentially, it may provide a 
feasible and effective model for other 
governments, whether national or sub-
national, to adopt.
Currently, New Zealand has no 
public institution specifically responsible 
for future generations. Nevertheless, 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment, established in 1986, 
partly serves this function, at least in 
terms of environmental matters. The 
commissioner has investigative, advisory 
and auditing roles, with the broad aim 
of improving environmental governance 
(Gopel, 2011; Hawke, 1997). The mandate 
of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment includes reviewing 
the effectiveness of environmental 
planning and management, as well as 
investigating issues where significant 
environmental impacts are likely. It has 
been suggested from time to time that 
the commissioner’s responsibilities could 
be extended to include a general duty 
to promote and protect the interests of 
future generations. However, this would 
substantially broaden the role of the 
Office, and without a large increase in 
resources and capabilities could weaken 
its current mission. 
Conclusion
Adequately protecting both the long-term 
interests of current citizens and the interests 
of future citizens is vitally important. 
At present, there are good reasons 
for doubting whether contemporary 
democratic institutions have sufficiently 
strong incentives to achieve this objective. 
That being the case, further reforms will be 
required to avoid policy decisions that are 
excessively biased in favour of the present. 
Somehow, the political voice representing 
future interests must be increased beyond 
a mere whisper, especially where there are 
risks of irreversible harm.
This article has outlined a range of 
possible responses, giving particular 
attention to the idea of incorporating 
additional protection for future 
generations in constitutional documents. 
We acknowledge that such an approach 
has limitations. For instance, while 
constitutional protections have the 
potential to reduce certain kinds of 
harm to future generations, they do not 
necessarily increase the incentives on 
policy makers to undertake the sorts of 
policy investments necessary to secure 
future benefits (e.g. via expenditure 
on public infrastructure, education or 
research). Hence, they are by no means 
sufficient. Further, we acknowledge that 
efforts to protect the interests (needs 
and/or rights) of future generations 
through constitutional mechanisms 
raise serious philosophical and legal 
issues. Nevertheless, they also provide 
a unique opportunity to effect change 
on a fundamental level and to shift the 
balance more in favour of longer-term 
considerations. 
Standing back from the particulars, 
three matters need emphasis. First, the 
... we acknowledge that efforts to protect 
the interests (needs and/or rights) of 
future generations through constitutional 
mechanisms raise serious philosophical 
and legal issues.
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